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The Politics of School Finance Reform in Connecticut 
 
Lesley DeNardis 




School finance reform has been one of the most controversial and 
contentious issues in public policy over the last thirty years.  Public 
schools have served as battlegrounds over fundamental questions 
of equality, liberty, and access to social and economic opportunities.    
Since the historic decision rendered by the California Supreme 
Court in Serrano v. Priest (1971) equated public education with a 
fundamental right, a wave of legal and legislative reforms swept 
the nation including the state of Connecticut.  Following the lead of 
California, plaintiffs in the Horton v.Meskill (1977) case argued that 
the Connecticut’s heavy reliance on the property tax to finance 
public schools was unconstitutional.  Finding in favor of the 
plaintiffs, the Connecticut Supreme Court directed the General 
Assembly to fashion a plan to equalize spending between school 
districts.  Thirty years and numerous attempts later, the goal of 
school finance reform to equalize spending across school districts 
has not produced the intended effects of reducing funding 
disparities.  In fact, some would argue that despite modest strides 
in equalizing spending, the gap between rich and poor districts has 
widened.  To account for this apparent policy failure, tentative 
explanations will entail a thorough examination of the key 
institutional actors involved in educational policy making as well 
as the following factors: political ideology, financial resource 
constraints, legal complexity and the political economy of school 
funding. By capturing the legal and legislative dynamics behind the 
school finance reform movement, a more nuanced and 
contextualized account emerges to explain the apparent failure of 
this policy in Connecticut. 





After the landmark school finance reform decision of Serrano v. Priest (1971) in 
California declared the reliance on the property tax to fund public schools as 
violating the principle of equal educational opportunity, Connecticut was among 
several states that followed suit with the case of Horton v. Meskill (1977) in the so-
called second wave of school finance litigation.1  The lawsuit filed in 1974 on 
behalf of then 10 year old Barnaby Horton against the administration of 
Governor Meskill, was the first to challenge the way Connecticut financed public 
education. At that time, local property taxes in Connecticut provided 
approximately seventy percent of the revenue to finance public schools.  The 
remaining thirty percent was derived from state and federal funds.  Such a 
funding scheme, the plaintiffs argued, created wide spending disparities 
between property-rich and property- poor towns. Similar to the reasoning in the 
California ruling, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the heavy reliance 
on the property tax to fund public education violated the mandate to provide an 
equal educational opportunity to all children.   
      In directing the state legislature to fashion a remedy, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court set in motion a thirty year quest to equalize school funding 
across Connecticut’s municipalities.  Successive legislatures, while rhetorically 
supporting reform, have failed to fully fund equalization schemes.  After thirty 
years of equalization efforts, the state still lags well behind the national average 
of a fifty percent with approximately 40% of the share of public school funding 
derived from state funds.2  Some studies argue that despite modest strides in 
                                               
1  Legal scholars have divided school finance litigation history into three waves to 
describe the differences in legal strategies employed by plaintiffs during each time 
period.  Second wave lawsuits challenged school finance systems through state 
education clauses, state equal protection clauses or both. For a full discussion, see Roelke, 
Green, and Zielewski (2004), 104-133. 
2  This figure was derived from a report compiled by the Connecticut Conference 
on Municipalities based on estimates for the Connecticut State Office of Fiscal Analysis.    
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equalizing spending, the gap between rich and poor districts in Connecticut has 
widened.3  Using the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of Horton v. Meskill, 
this study traces the political history of school finance reform from the landmark 
Horton case in 1977 to the Education Finance Commission of 2007.  By capturing 
the legal and legislative dynamics behind the school finance reform movement, a 
more nuanced and contextualized account emerges to explain the apparent 
failure of this policy in Connecticut.  Tentative explanations will entail a 
thorough examination of the following factors: political ideology, state financial 
resource constraints, legal complexity and the political economy of school 
funding. 
      The Serrano case attracted a great deal of scholarly attention on the topic 
of school finance reform (Berke 1974; Coons, Clune and Sugerman 
1970,;Furhman 1979, Wise 1968).  Numerous national level studies have 
examined the impact on court ordered school finance reform.  However, few if 
any detailed case studies have been conducted to analyze the specific trajectory 
of the reforms in Connecticut.   Where Connecticut has been included in multiple 
case studies, it has often been given secondary or tertiary treatment (Reed 2001).  
In addition to methodological issues,  the foci of much of the scholarly research 
that has been conducted to date in this area has revolved around the history of 
litigation efforts in school finance published in legal, economic or public finance 
journals.  These studies have highlighted the various court cases filed nationwide 
and their impact on school spending.   For example, an oft-cited study by Evans, 
Murray and Schwab (1997) examined the time period from 1972-1992 to assess 
the impact of court reform on the states. They found a differential impact of 
spending across the states. Again, the reasons for the differential in spending 
                                                                                                                                            
For a full discussion see K-12 Public Education: The State of the State and Local 
Partnership CCM Public Policy Report CCM January 2009 
3  One longitudinal study of Connecticut’s school finance equalization plan found 
that after the first six years, inequalities were worse than at the time of the court’s 
decision.  For a full discussion, see Reed (2001). 
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have not been fully delineated. Such cross national studies that assess the impact 
of court cases in the aggregate have not dwelled on the specific trajectory of 
change that occurred in Connecticut.  Moreover, these studies by aggregating 
results either overstate or understate the success or failure of reform efforts.   
     Such comparative studies, while important for achieving a general 
understanding of school finance reform, do little to shed light on the reasons for 
the trajectory of reform in individual states including Connecticut.  In pointing 
out the shortcomings of national level studies Michael A. Rebell (2002, 7) cites the 
need for case studies to provide answers to questions about the success or failure 
of reform efforts.  
The tremendous diversity in facts, legal rights and 
requirements, political context, and specific holdings of courts in 
various states makes it impossible to draw meaningful conclusions 
from national-level studies on the impact of fiscal equity litigation. 
 
      This study proposes to fill such a vacuum through an examination of key 
political and legal actors in Connecticut to permit a better understanding of the 
underlying dynamics of school finance reform during its inception in the 1970s 
when legislators took the court’s decision and crafted the first equalization plan.   
Key turning points in the legal and political history will be highlighted with 
special attention being given to the inception of school finance reform in the 
1970s and early 1980s during the passage of the first equalization legislation in 
1975, the legislative reform of 1979 in the aftermath of Horton v. Meskill (1977), the 
adoption of the Education Cost Sharing Grant (ECS) in the aftermath of Horton v. 
Meskill III (1985), and finally the seventh state commission to study school 
finance reform in 2007.   
      Finally, this study analyzes the role that major institutional actors namely 
the courts, the legislature, the executive branch, as well as municipalities have 
played in order to provide a comprehensive explanation for the failure of school 
finance reform.  The failure is likely the product of a dynamic interplay of all of 
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these institutions in policy formulation and implementation with each 
contributing its share to the policy stalemate. 
Role of the Courts in School Finance Reform 
The role of the courts in policy making in the area of school finance has 
been thoroughly examined in numerous national level studies.  The foci of these 
inquiries has been on the dynamics of judicial decision making, the specific 
holdings in each of the cases, and finally, the impact of court ordered reforms on 
equalization plans.  Scholarship on the role of courts in the area of school finance 
reform has been divided between those that portray the judicial branch as having 
a catalytic effect on legislatures (Bosworth 2001) and those that portray it as 
having a negligible effect on reform (Rosenberg 2008).  Dinan (1996) found that 
courts can be effective when certain conditions are met such as when the general 
public and at least one political branch support the goals of the decision and 
when the court gives the legislature flexibility in crafting a remedy. 
     Embedded in such debates about the efficacy of courts on school finance 
are questions about the appropriate role of the judicial branch in policy making.  
The mixed results from national level studies reflect the sensitivity that some 
courts have displayed toward charges of judicial activism.  Among the many 
lessons from the desegregation battles after Brown, the judicial branch learned 
that course decisions by themselves are not a wholly adequate response to given 
social problems. The Connecticut Supreme Court reflects this concern as it 
recognized its duty to interpret the law and stayed its hand in ordering a specific 
remedy for school finance.  It declining to prescribe a remedy for school finance 
reform, it called upon the legislature to devise an equalization plan. 
      Given the prevailing legal trends nationwide for far reaching reforms 
among jurists after Serrano, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s restraint is 
understandable in light of two factors.  One factor is the omnipresent political 
consideration in Connecticut of a political culture steeped in strong traditions of 
local control.  In fact, when directing the General Assembly to fashion a plan to 
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equalize spending in Horton v. Meskill (1977) the court case specifically states that 
an equalization plan would not require towns to spend the same amount on 
education. The second factor relates to timing of the case which emerged during 
the second wave of litigation late 1970s.  As Roelke et al (2004) observed in their 
national study of legal trends, second-wave courts were not prescriptive in their 
mandates out of deference to the legislative branch.  In Horton (1977), the 
majority decision references the consideration to both local control and judicial 
restraint by leaving the matter to political bodies to devise “ultimate solutions”4.   
Later, in the context of Horton (III) the court continued this approach by trodding 
a middle ground in devising a three-part test making it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to demonstrate inequities while at the same time prompting the state 
legislature to return to the drawing board in devising a new equalization plan. 
Role of the Connecticut State Legislature in School Finance Reform 
While some accounts of school finance litigation place the Courts at center 
stage attributing failure or success to the jurisprudence of school finance reform, 
an equally, if not more compelling institution in assessing the impact of school 
finance reform, is the state legislature.  Legislative bodies play a key role in the 
appropriation of state funds for education.  In examining the role that legislators 
play with respect to the state budget, with the myriad incentives or disincentives 
for policy reform, it is clear that school finance places legislators in a precarious 
position.  On the one hand, they are seldom in favor of proposing new spending 
initiatives for fear of electoral backlash.  On the other hand, openly opposing 
school finance and equal opportunity would be an untenable position given the 
discourse on social justice that has firmly taken root in American society.  On the 
other hand, as one Connecticut state legislator more colorfully summarized the 
dilemma: voting against school finance reform would be akin to “voting against 
                                               
4  The majority decision in this decision stated that the legislature is the appropriate 
body to devise “ultimate solutions.  The case is also noteworthy for declining to make 
school finances a federally justiciable matter. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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motherhood.”5  Thus, most Connecticut state legislators have had to navigate a 
middle ground, one on which they enact modest and incremental reforms to pass 
muster with the courts while not arousing the ire of key constituencies, namely 
taxpayers. 
       The Connecticut State Legislature has been particularly adept at such 
symbolic gestures which give the outward appearance of complying with court 
directives while in actuality rolling back many key spending provisions through 
delays, phased-in spending plans, and numerous amendments to cap spending 
which have had the effect, intended or otherwise, of blunting the impact of court 
decisions.  While initially taking a proactive stance in spurring an equalization 
plan in 1975 before the courts ordered it to do so, the legislative response ever 
since that time has been slower and the reforms more modest in comparison to 
many other states that were faced with similar circumstances in adopting school 
aid formulas that attempt to equalize spending across school districts. 
A second question relates to the equalization plan that the legislature 
devised during this time period to comply with the Court’s decision in 1977. 
While revising the existing grant system that awarded a flat grant of $250 per 
pupil regardless of a town’s need, the legislature choose a Guaranteed Tax Base 
approach.   The GTB is designed to reward equal local tax effort with equal 
revenues from state and local sources.  In his discussion of the types of reforms 
enacted by state legislatures in school finance, Odden (1982) noted that reforms 
fell into three categories:  Guaranteed Tax Base [GTB], foundational grant, and 
GTB with a foundation model.  The latter was considered to be more effective in 
                                               
5  During the final House debate on May 17, 1975 to enact the state’s first 
guaranteed tax base plan Representative Nevas who represented Westport, CT(136th 
General Assembly District) articulated his perspective on the dilemma he faced in 
opposing funding equalization in schools. While stating his objections to the bill he 
noted that his district would not gain any additional funds from the plan.  Nevas would 
later become a federal judge. 
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meeting equity standards by adjusting for local contribution.6  These reforms can 
be placed along a spectrum with the GTB as the more conservative option and 
the foundation model as entailing a greater state contribution. While Connecticut 
eventually moved to a foundation plan in the form of the ECS, it largely was 
prompted to do so by the court after Horton III (1985).  
      The perennial reworking of school aid formulas by the legislature for over 
thirty years has prompted the plaintiffs to continue their legal challenges 
suggesting that the rate and pace of reforms were not satisfactory.  During the 
early 1980s, the legislature undercut the GTB by passing amendments to limit 
and cap spending. Wesley Horton returned to the courtroom and argued 
successfully that the legislature was eroding the intent of the legislation and the 
intent of Horton (I).  In the subsequent decision known as Horton v. Meskill (III) in 
1985, the legislature moved to a foundational model otherwise known as the 
educational cost sharing or ECS as it is commonly referred to today.    The 
judicial and legislative branches in Connecticut had been locked in this back and 
forth pattern in which the court issues a mandate, the legislature minimally 
complies, the plaintiffs return to court, and so on.  The latest in this judicial-
legislative saga is a case brought by the Connecticut Coalition for Justice in 
Education Funding in 2005 against the administration of Governor Rell.  The 
State Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the spring of 2008 for which a 
decision is still pending. 
Role of the Chief Executive in School Finance Reform 
Though the court in Horton (I and III) placed the onus on the legislature to 
craft a school equalization plan, the importance of the chief executive cannot be 
ignored.  The slower rate and pace of school reform in Connecticut is due in part 
to executive leadership. Governors are in a unique position through policy 
                                               
6  For example, a foundation of $7,000 per pupil could lead to a state distribution of 
$5,000 per pupil in a poor district and a state distribution of $2,000 in a rich district.  The 
poor district would contribute $2,000 while the rich district would contribute $5,000 per 
pupil.   
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proposals and the bully pulpit to champion reform efforts.  Conversely, they are 
also capable of benign neglect.  This study will examine the role that successive 
governors have played in the school finance debate.    Chief executives, during 
the inception of the first equalization plans and throughout most of the time 
period examined in this study, were not especially receptive to reforms. In fact, 
successive governors have been named as defendants in school finance litigation 
and have attempted to fend off litigation by defending the status quo.   
      The reasons for gubernatorial inaction stem in part from the role of chief 
executives as guardians of the budget.  Political ideology appears to have played 
a more secondary role.  Many of these patterns of executive action or inaction are 
predictable given the role of governors as having central responsibility for the 
formulation and execution of the state budget.  Having to navigate among the 
competing spending priorities and other fiscal constraints, most governors are 
reluctant to propose any new spending initiatives, especially during 
economically difficult times.  In a retrospective look at Connecticut, key school 
finance reform court decisions and legislation dovetailed with economic 
recessions and budget deficits. Governor Meskill, the defendant in the first 
Horton case, dealt with a recession in the early 1970s during which time he took 
the unpopular decision to raise certain taxes and cut services.  In speaking before 
the General Assembly in February 1971, Meskill delivered a grim budget 
message that was repeated by his successor Ella Grasso in February, 1975 in what 
became known as “the cupboard is bare” speech: 
The cupboard, to be sure, is very bare.  The document before 
you tonight is in every sense of the word an austerity budget.  The 
budget message is also a sad legacy of bad budgeting, of unrealistic 
figures and of deficit.  The failure to face these problems squarely 
has resulted in a budget for this fiscal year that leaves the state in a 
deteriorating fiscal position (Keating 2009). 
 
      Economic recessions continued to mark the early 1980s and the early 
1990s constraining gubernatorial action in the area of school finance reform.  
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During the mid-80s, there was a brief period of economic recovery during which 
time the legislature appropriated more funds for school aid.  However, it was not 
until the State of Connecticut was in the fortuitous position of a budget surplus 
that a dramatic policy proposal was championed by Governor Rell during the 
2007 session of the General Assembly.  The Governor proposed to spend 3.4 
billion in additional state aid over five years to assist municipalities in meeting 
educational costs (Editor 2007). Such a plan would enable Connecticut to finally 
achieve a 50/50 cost sharing ratio between the state and school districts.  The 
plan was ultimately defeated by a Democratic majority in the General Assembly 
that chose to fund other spending priorities.  
Role of Municipalities in School Finance Reform 
      Another dimension of the school finance dilemma concerns the 
countervailing influence of municipalities as well the competing priorities 
embodied by the various interest groups operative at the local level.  In 
Connecticut, the politics of school finance reform invariably pits the property-
rich towns against the property- poor towns whose goals in devising school aid 
formulas differ sharply (Pennington 2006).  The former seek to utilize school aid 
to bolster their school budgets and as a mechanism to provide property tax relief.  
The latter would prefer to use school aid to relieve municipal overburden.  These 
dichotomous views factored into the legislative debates of 1975 and 1978 as 
various school aid formulas were being devised.  Compounding the problem, 
neither municipal chief executives nor school superintendents view their share of 
equalization funds grant as sufficient due to rising school costs and inflationary 
effects.  Chief among their concerns is the inadequacy of funds to meet their 
school budgetary needs.  Particularly strong advocates of greater funding have 
been the suburban municipalities who have seen their share of the ECS funds 
dwindle over the years while urban centers receive the lion’s share due to the 
legislature’s reworking of the school aid formula which gives greater weight to 
income and other urban factors. As one legislator remarked, “school aid money 
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was the only new revenue game in town” (DeNardis, Lesley 2008).  This was not 
lost on urban legislators who sought greater shares of the funds in this new 
revenue game.          
      One of the factors contributing to the policy stalemate in Connecticut 
stems from the political economy of school funding equalization plans.  School 
finance equalization schemes are redistributive in nature and necessarily 
engender intense conflicts (Mintrom 1993).  In the school finance debate, these 
have chiefly been between rich and poor districts, as well as reflecting the divide 
of rural, suburban and urban districts (Wise 1969).  The General Assembly is the 
legislative arena where these conflicts have played out.  Legislators, as 
representatives of local districts, have had to be cognizant of electoral majorities 
in crafting a remedy to school finance reform.  A fuller explanation for policy 
failure may lie in the incentives faced by legislators, taxpayers and parents of 
school students.  In so doing, they have been sensitive to local taxpayers’ 
concerns.  Municipalities have undoubtedly served to constrain the actions of 
state legislators particularly in suburban municipalities which are 
overwhelmingly represented in the Connecticut General Assembly. 
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First Commission to Study 
School Finance and Equal 
Educational Opportunity 
appointed by Connecticut 
General Assembly 
 
Recommendations provided the basis for the first 
equalization plan in Connecticut 
1974 Superior Court Ruling in Horton 
v. Meskill (I) 
Ruled Connecticut’ school finance system as 
unconstitutional, Meskill administration appeals 
decision to the State Supreme Court 
1975 Guaranteed Tax Base 
Legislation passed 
School finance  
1977 State Supreme Court decision 
on Horton v. Meskill (II) 
State Supreme Court upholds Superior Court’s ruling 
1978 Second Commission on School 
Finance Reform convenes to 
comply with court decision 
 
1979 A Plan for Promoting Equal 
Educational Opportunity in 
Connecticut  
 
1979 HB passed by General 
Assembly  
Public Act 79-128 modifies the Guarantee Tax Base plan 
to include a minimum expenditure requirement 
1980 Horton returns to court  
1984 Superior Court Spada issues 
ruling 
State ordered to spend more money on schools 
  Governor O’Neill appealed the decision 
1985 Horton v. Meskill (III) Court affirmed the constitutionality of the GTB formula 
and ruled that plaintiffs must pass a three-pronged test  
Legislature begins work on a new school finance plan 
1988 State legislature passed the 
“foundation model” 
 
1989 State legislature passed the 
Education Cost Sharing Plan 
Replaces the Guaranteed Tax Base plan with a new 
formula 
2005 CCJEF v. Rell Challenged the level of funding in Connecticut as 
inadequate 
2007 Seventh Commission on 
Education Finance 
Issued key recommendations to Governor Rell 
including a 50-50 state-local school cost sharing plan 
and accountability measures for school districts in  
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“Brown By Other Means”:  Serrano, Horton, and the School Finance Litigation 
Movement in Connecticut 
Horton v. Meskill (1977) emerged amidst the backdrop of a civil rights 
movement that was entering a second and more mature phase marked by 
redressing economic inequities in every corner of American life.  The 1960s-70s 
was a period that was marked by feverish activity and policy innovation 
unleashed by Brown v. Board of Education (1954).  The landmark Supreme Court 
decision declared “separate but equal” to be unconstitutional and called for 
schools to begin desegregation with “all deliberate speed”.  Buoyed by this 
victory, the Brown decision propelled the civil rights movement forward and 
ushered in a period of intense public policy activity.  Civil rights reformers 
examined virtually every corner of American life in an effort to remedy past 
discrimination in the areas of voting rights, fair housing, public schools, and 
employment among others.   
      In revisiting the Brown decisions nearly two decades later, many of the 
hoped for results in pursuing equal educational opportunity had not been fully 
achieved.   There was a sense of disappointment among those who were active in 
the civil rights movement that the legacy of Brown had lost momentum (Eaton 
2004). While de jure segregation had largely been defeated, de facto segregation 
persisted due to residential housing patterns.  Two decades after the Brown 
decision, there was a growing realization that despite desegregation policies, 
inequalities still persisted in many public schools across the United States owing 
to a concentration of poor minorities in urban centers.  Reformers set their sights 
on the financing of education as another avenue to remedy inequities.   
      In his book Courts as Catalysts, Matthew Bosworth referred to the ensuing 
litigation over school finance as “a continuation of Brown by other means” 
(Bosworth 2001, 11).  This sentiment was echoed by the Connecticut State 
Department of Education in 1976.  The report reflects the conventional wisdom of the 
time that equalizing aid to towns will have an impact on equal educational 
opportunities. 
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In the past generation, a second edge of that cutting sword 
of equality has emerged with real force.  Its fundamental thrust is 
money:  how it is to be most fairly generated in support of public 
education, and how it is to be distributed so that equal resources 
support the education of each child (Anonymous 1976, 1). 
  
     School finance reform became the second front to wage the battle against 
inequality.  The landmark decision that ushered in school finance litigation in 
virtually every state was Serrano v. Priest (1971).  Acknowledging that there mere 
removal of legal barriers to education such as ending desegregation would not 
accomplish the hoped for effects of equalizing educational opportunity, a second 
prong in the legal strategy would challenge the constitutionality of school 
funding systems at the state level.  The policy impetus found its intellectual 
parentage in the seminal work in a book on school finance reform by Coons, 
Clune and Sugerman (1970) entitled Private Wealth and Public Education.   Coons 
et al.  summarized the relevant legal issues first raising the specter of litigation 
with the contention that funding disparities violate the 14th amendment equal 
protection clause.  Reliance on the property tax resulted in wide variation in 
spending between districts making equality of educational opportunity largely 
dependent on where one lived.  Equal protection of the laws in terms of 
educational opportunity, they argued was violated by such a funding scheme.     
      The lead counsel for the plaintiffs in Serrano v. Priest (1971), not 
surprisingly, was John Coons.  After mounting a vigorous argument showing the 
stark spending disparities between wealthy districts such as Beverly Hills and 
Baldwin Park, the latter being home to a largely low-income Hispanic population, 
the court ruled that significant disparities between districts in terms of spending 
due to an uneven distribution of taxable wealth violated the equal protection 
clause of the state constitution.  Moreover, the Serrano court held that property 
wealth should not play a role in the amount of money available for education 
declaring that all children are guaranteed a right to public education regardless 
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of where they lived.  The Serrano case created widespread interest whose impact 
was far reaching.   
Serrano provided a blueprint for continued litigation by its 
success on state level fundamentality and equal protection claims, 
and it showed that state constitutions might be vulnerable in ways 
unavailable at the federal level. (Thompson, Wood and Crampton, 
60). 
 
      Serrano became to school finance reform what Brown was to the civil rights 
movement, both a rallying cry and a blueprint for action for school finance 
reformers.  In fact, the Serrano decision cited Brown in its decision stating 
unequivocally that education was the most important service provided by state 
and local government.  The next year eleven states reformed their school finance 
systems as the result of court decisions.  The Serrano court articulated a standard 
referred to as fiscal neutrality which held that property wealth should not play a 
role in the amount of money available for education.  The fiscal neutrality 
standard would later be utilized by school reformers in Connecticut in devising 
the Guaranteed Tax Base formula.   
      Legal entrepreneurs detected a fertile landscape to test their theories in the 
arena of school finance reform.  John Coons, the “Father of Fiscal Neutrality” and 
lead Counsel on the Serrano case, captured the prevailing political and legal 
climate when he addressed a group of Connecticut policymakers in 1978: 
In the late 1960s, I suppose inflamed by the hope of the 
Warren Court, lawyers around the country decided it would be a 
good thing to apply some of the doctrines relating to poverty that 
were emerging from the Supreme Court to education (Coons 1978). 
 
One such legal entrepreneur was a freshly minted, Harvard trained lawyer, 
Wesley Horton, who later went on to achieve prominence arguing the now 
famous Horton v Meskill (1977, 1985) cases, the Sheff desegregation case (1996), 
and the eminent domain case Kelo v. New London (2005). Having just completed a 
clerkship under Connecticut Supreme Court Justice House in the late 1960s, he 
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came away from that experience “with the conviction that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court was a grossly underused resource” (Horton 1991).  He quickly 
set his sights on school funding informed from the unique vantage point of a 
father whose son was enrolled in the Canton school system, a rural town outside 
of Hartford. 
Horton also happened to be a member of Canton’s School Board.  Dealing 
with the complexities of school finance from the ground up, he discovered in the 
course of his duties that Connecticut used a flat grant of $250 per town as the 
only method of equalizing spending across school districts (Eaton 2004).  Horton 
would argue that Canton as a property poor rural district was unable to garner 
sufficient revenues through the property tax to provide an adequate education.   
           An examination of the facts led Horton to the conclusion that the 
Constitution State was particularly susceptible to litigation.  At the time that 
Horton v. Meskill was filed in Superior Court in 1973, Connecticut ranked fiftieth 
in terms of equalization measures and was one of only five states which utilized 
a flat grant system which was considered to be the most conservative and least 
equalizing method of providing state support to public schools, points Horton 
raised during the trial.  In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court stated that of 
all the ways that states throughout the country distribute state funds, “the flat 
grant has the least equalizing effect on local financial abilities” (376 A.2d 359 (Ct. 
1977), at 369).  Representative of the prevailing mood and belief in positive 
government, Horton v. Meskill (1977) was the first test case to challenge school 
funding in Connecticut. 
Horton pointed out that the school financing system violated Article I of 
the Connecticut State Constitution’s equal protection clause and Article VIII 
which provided for free public elementary and secondary schools in the state.  
Armed with social scientific studies and quantitative data, the plaintiffs 
successfully made the case that Connecticut’s method of financing public 
education, primarily through the property tax, violated the state constitution.  
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The court’s decision included a comparative analysis of several Connecticut 
towns to demonstrate the disparities in tax effort and the sharp differential that 
the tax effort of different towns could yield for school expenditures.  The highest 
per pupil operating expenses were for Darien at $1570.47 while Canton’s was 
$945 yet Canton had to levy a higher mill rate.7  “Levelling” up to the Darien 
standard would animate policy reformers in subsequent years.  In upholding the 
Superior Court’s ruling, Horton’s mentor, Justice House spoke for the majority 
and agreed with the plaintiffs that the linking of the quality of a child’s education 
to the property wealth of his or her community was: 
Sheer irrationality as of the state’s system of financing 
education in the state on the basis of property values would be 
similar and no less tenable should the state make educational 
expenditures dependent  upon some other irrelevant factor such as 
the number of telephone poles in the district (376 A.2d 359 (Ct. 1977) 
at 373). 
 
In a 4-1 decision, the court ruled that the school finance plan was 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the education rights clause and 
the equal protection clause of the Connecticut state constitution.8  Moreover, it 
also concluded that education was a fundamental right under the state’s 
constitution’s equal protection provision by virtue of the degree of support given 
to education by the legislature through the state’s history (376 A 2d 359 (Ct. 1977) 
quoting Anonymous (1972), 1303, 1307).  In a blow to local control proponents, 
the court did not consider it to be a “compelling state interest” an oft cited 
                                               
7  In the Court’s decision, the disparities were noted:  “taxpayers in property-poor 
towns such as Canton pay higher tax rates for education than taxpayers in property-rich 
towns.  The higher tax rates generate tax revenues in comparatively small amounts and 
property-poor towns cannot afford the education of their pupils, on a per pupil basis, 
the same amounts that property-rich towns do,” 376 A.2d 359 (Ct. 1977), at 368. 
8  The Connecticut Constitution was rewritten in 1965 to include a constitutional 
right to a free public education.  Until that time, Connecticut was the only state without 
a constitutional guarantee to a public education. For a full discussion of the 
constitutional history see Collier (2008). 
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argument to justify differential treatment for education among districts.  The 
decision mirrored much of the logic and reasoning of the Serrano case.   
Voices of Dissent:  Elite and Mass Opinion Toward School Finance 
Equalization In the Wake of Horton v. Meskill (1977) 
 
Justice Loiselle “The Lone Dissenter on the Connecticut State Supreme Court” 
The nearly unanimous Horton decision belied the undercurrent of 
dissenting voices both within the legal community and among various opinion 
makers who expressed their reservations about the decision.  In the dissenting 
opinion, Judge Loiselle disagreed with the majority regarding the 
fundamentality of the right to education in Connecticut. 
No one argues that the state’s financial system causes an 
absolute denial of educational opportunities to any child or that 
education received in elementary or secondary schools is not free, 
as mandated by the state constitution.  After you’ve brushed the 
foam off the beer, the plaintiff’s argument concerns only one item–-
money (376 A.2d 359 (Ct. 1977) at 378). 
 
Justice Loiselle further stated his objections referencing the famous the Coleman 
Report which cast doubt on the linkage between expenditures and student 
performance (Coleman 1966).  
I am not persuaded that expenditures for educational 
opportunities above the reasonable minimum mandated by the 
legislature have any substantial effect on the education of students 
over the long pull.  The Coleman Report suggests that any such 
thesis is open to serious question.  Although the trial court did no 
make an express finding, it recognized in its memorandum that 
there is a serious lessening marginal utility for each successive 
increment of educational input (376 A.2d 359 (Ct. 1977), at 379). 
 
Echoes of Justice Loiselle’s doubting comments could be heard from different 
quarters in the legal community and in the legislative debates and public 
hearings that transpired in the Connecticut General Assembly during the spring 
of 1975 and 1979. 
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The Legal Community and School Finance Reform 
     Voices of dissent continue to inform some of the school finance reform 
debates and doubts about the feasibility of finance equalization plans to remedy 
inequities between school districts.   A widely cited article that appeared in the 
Yale Law Journal in 1973, openly questions the underlying rationale of the 
Serrano decision (Churgin, Ehrenberg, and Grossi, Jr. 1972).  Among the criticisms, 
the authors of the article argued that the decision itself rested on three faulty 
premises: 1) the individual wealth of the residents of a school district is directly 
related to the assessed value of the property in that district, 2) assessed property 
value is directly related to local expenditure levels and 3) local expenditure levels 
are directly related to the quality of education.  The second and third premises 
resonated with fiscal conservatives who held that municipalities that were 
fiscally conservative and prudent in their expenditures could be good stewards 
of the resources while still providing a quality education.  
Public Opinion Towards School Finance Reform in Connecticut 
      Discerning public opinion towards school finance equalization is a 
difficult task. Formal public opinion polls have been scant and respondents can 
seldom be reliably accounted for given the sensitive nature of the subject.  
Perhaps the most candid responses towards school finance reform can be found 
in the early days in the wake of the Horton decision when the subject was fresh 
in the minds of many citizens and before any remedies had been devised.  As the 
legislature devised its court-ordered school finance equalization plan in the 
spring of 1979, numerous public hearings which shed led on a segment of public 
opinion and the various education interest groups representing an array of 
teachers and parents.  As Christopher Collier (2008, 604) recounts in vivid detail:  
“Angry citizens went so far as to assert that the education article should never 
have been added to the constitution, and that the proper response for the 
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legislature would have been to find some constitutional means to set aside the 
court decision.”9   
     The thrust of the Serrano decision and its progeny which centered on the 
notion of equality of opportunity collided directly with another deeply held 
American value, local control.  Twin pillars of American political culture and at 
times incompatible, liberty and equality have occupied a central place in the U.S. 
pantheon of politics and policies.  American education policy is caught in the 
crosscurrents of these two competing ideas.  Public opinion polls reveal the 
ambivalence towards education which vacillates between the belief in equality 
on the one hand versus local control on the on the other hand.  Americans 
routinely express strong beliefs regarding the notion of equality in abstract terms.  
This abstract value often conflicts with other values such as liberty.   
      Local control is another cherished value among Americans that has deep 
roots dating back to colonial times.  At its core, local control can be construed as 
fundamentally a question of liberty or freedom.  The ideological questions 
underlying school finance reform bring into play two incompatible strains in 
American political thought that have competed for primacy in state educational 
policy: In Connecticut, the tendency towards local control is especially 
pronounced, Reed’s (2001) study of public opinion in Connecticut found that 
among the explanatory factors regarding opposition to school finance reform, 
local control proved to be the most salient in determining the degree of public 
support or opposition to school finance reform in Connecticut. 
Attitudes towards equality in public school funding involve 
a complex mix of ideology and attitudes towards school 
governance that transcends a battle of haves versus have nots.  
Indeed, in Connecticut the strongest contributor to opposition to 
                                               
9  The education clause was added to the Connecticut State Constitution as the 
result of the Constitutional Convention of 1965. 
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funding schools equally stemmed from fears of a loss of local 
control.10 
 
      School finance reform entails fundamental questions about equality which 
stated in abstract terms draw support from most Americans.  Yet when 
confronted with specific choices among public policies which entail trade-offs 
between competing spending priorities, they generally oppose the tax increases 
necessary to support school finance reform.  Such contradictory and competing 
ideas found in public opinion find their expression in legislative behavior.  State 
legislators, undoubtedly aware of their constituents mixed views, have had to 
navigate this difficult terrain to craft equalization plans.  
Policy Entrepreneurs and School Finance Reform in Connecticut 
          Months before Wesley Horton entered Superior Court, a contingent of 
lawmakers from Connecticut (including State Representatives DeNardis, 
Klebanoff, and Truex) attended a seminar in Texas sponsored by the Education 
Commission of the States in the summer of 1973 where the Serrano decision was 
widely discussed.  The consensus at the conference was that more school finance 
litigation would soon follow in other states. Upon their return home, the 
legislators quickly began to work on a new school finance plan in the hopes of 
preempting the impending court action (DeNardis 2008). “The Commission to 
Study School Finance and Equal Educational Opportunity” was established by 
the Republican controlled 1973 General Assembly and was comprised of 
                                               
10  Reed’s study drew from two public opinion surveys conducted by the University 
of Connecticut’s Roper Center during the spring of 1979.  The wording of the first survey 
was “Some people feel that the same amount ought to be spent for the public schools 
throughout Connecticut.  Others think that the citizens of each town should be able to 
decide how much they want to spend on education.  Which do you think is more 
important, 1) to fund schools equally, or 2) to let towns decide how much to spend on 
their schools?  In a follow up poll, the wording of the questions changed substantially to 
read:  “Some people say that the state should see to it that rich communities and poor 
communities have the same amount of money per student to spend on their schools.  In 
general, do you favor this or oppose it?” In the second poll, 74% responded in favor of 
equality up from 45% in the previous poll.  For a full discussion see Reed (2001). 
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fourteen legislators, the commissioners of education and finance, and eleven 
interest groups.  After a year and a half long study, a plan was unveiled to the 
legislature during the 1975 session of the Connecticut General Assembly.  As one 
lawmaker succinctly summarized it, the legislature “had a rare opportunity to 
get a jump on a developing major public problem to prevent the usual 
government by crisis decision making” (Opinion Article 1979).  The impetus for 
reform came from a few members of the Connecticut state legislature, both 
Democrats and Republicans who championed and propelled forward the school 
finance reform agenda.  Their viewpoints and experience prevailed in the design 
of the first equalization plan.   
      In crafting their proposals, the Commission turned to a national network 
of school finance activists, policy professionals, and academics that had begun to 
take shape after the legal battles surrounding Brown.  The “reform movement 
could share information about developments in each state and use data to 
persuade recalcitrant state legislatures of the funding problems”. (Ladd, Chalk 
and Hansen 1999)  Serving as “ground zero” in the policy arena was the 
Teacher’s College at Columbia University led by researcher, Donna Shalala, who 
later went on to become Health and Human Services Secretary under President 
Clinton.  Shalala, a young and rising academic star, was primarily responsible for 
generating data that the Commission would use to undergird its proposals. 
Policy Options Pre-Horton I 
The existing system to finance schools in Connecticut was heavily reliant 
upon the property tax. The only equalization measure at that time was a per-
pupil flat grant of $250 that was distributed to all municipalities regardless of 
local need or ability to pay. Connecticut lagged the nation in terms of 
equalization measures. All of these facts weighed on the mind of the commission 
members as they grappled with how to reform Connecticut’s lopsided school 
funding system. 
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On the one hand were deeply concerned with designing a school aid plan 
that would pass muster with a looming court threat.  On the other hand, they 
were acutely aware of the economic and financial realities of the state.  As astute 
observers of the political realities and gauging what would be politically 
acceptable to their legislative colleagues they examined several different school 
aid programs including the Foundation Plan, Percentage Equalizing Plan and 
Full State Funding (Connecticut State Department of Education 1976).  However, 
only two were given serious consideration and those were largely centered on 
tax equalization.  Full funding schemes or “robin hood” approaches that 
recaptured funds from wealthier towns to redistribute to poorer towns would 
not be politically acceptable.  Neither would be complete centralization of school 
funding at the state level as the state of Hawaii  and a few other states had 
chosen utilize. 
School Funding Formulas 
Embedded in the design of school aid plans are underlying philosophical 
beliefs about the role and purpose of government.  Funding formulas vary across 
the U.S. but the main variants can be classified as flat grants, equalization grants, 
multitier grants, and full state funding grants.  The Commission to Study School 
Finance examined all the plans in use at the time but seriously only considered 
the two which were deemed to be congruent with Connecticut’s political culture.  
In fact, the Commission’s report references the fact that the decision to utilize the 
GTB was based on Connecticut’s strong tradition of local control.  In explaining 
its rationale for the adoption of the GTB, the Commission report stated that:   
We reviewed all the major methods which can be used to 
finance current operating expenditures.  The other alternatives 
(foundation program, percentage equalizing grant, full state 
assumption) were rejected for reasons of cost and the decline in 
local control over school expenditures and tax rate which might 
result from their implementation.  When fully implemented, this 
GTB will represent a major step toward equalizing educational 
opportunity.  Its basic appeal to Connecticut lies in its maintenance 
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of local control of schools.  Furthermore, it does not take money 
directly from one town to equalize expenditures in another town 
(Anonymous 1975, 18). 
 
      As Thompson, Wood, and Crampton (2008, 85) note, “states favoring a 
more local control perspective tended to devise plans that left considerable local 
freedom to exceed a set of educational minimums”.  In other words, 
municipalities who chose to expend funds in excess of the minimum would not 
be penalized.  So it was that the first school finance reform came in the form of an 
equalization grant which rewards tax effort rather than property wealth.  The 
percent equalizing or district power equalizing grant as a school aid formula is a 
conservative approach to reform insofar as it accepts as a given the property tax 
as a legitimate method of financing public schools.   Each approach embodies 
certain values such:  equity, efficiency and liberty (Garms, Guthrie and Pierce, 
1978).   Efficiency-enhancing initiatives such as the guaranteed tax base has as its 
main focus on the maintenance of local control of taxation and seeks to minimize 
the shift of decision making power to the state.   The state guarantees that at a 
given tax rate, a town will be able to raise a certain amount otherwise the state 
makes up the difference.   
The Guaranteed Tax Base Legislation of 1975:  The First School Finance 
Equalization Measure in Connecticut 
The Commission presented the General Assembly with two options: 1) 
equalize expenditures or 2) equalize tax capacity or tax raising power.  The 
Commission chose the latter because they believed it dealt more directly with the 
problem to try to achieve tax neutrality among the citizens of the state in 
providing for the educational needs of children.  The bill utilizes the principle of 
district power equalizing or guaranteed tax base.  The first GTB program was 
comprised of a formula that included: 1) wealth, 2) local tax effort, and 3) need.11  
                                               
11  Wealth was calculated as the difference between the town’s property wealth per 
pupil and the property wealth per pupil that was at the 85th percentile in the state in per 
pupil property wealth.  Need was based on the total population of the town. 
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Calculation of the GTB grant begins with the ranking of all towns based on their 
ability to pay for school services from local tax sources.  If the program were 
fully funded, the GTB would guarantee each town the same amount of money 
for each of its pupils as the 85th percentile town at any given tax rate.   
      Some legislators decried the fact that the final bill went beyond what the 
commission recommended to the legislature in January.  Instead of the 75th 
percentile it used the 85th percentile and instead of using assessed valuation in 
each community per pupil it uses per capita and a median family income factor.  
Under this plan, 144 towns would receive aid and 25 towns would be held 
harmless meaning that they will receive their basis aid under the Average Daily 
Membership (ADM) but not receive additional money under the GTB.  Each 
town would be ranked in ascending order from poorest to richest.  The goal 
would be to raise the bottom 85 percent of towns to the 85th percentile.   
     In what was the first of many revisions, the General Assembly capped the 
equalization grants so that no school district would receive more than $12.50 per 
pupil during the first year of implementation and then raised it to $18.25 during 
the 1976 session.  If fully funded the new program would have guaranteed each 
town roughly the same amount of money as would be raised in the 85th 
percentile town however, due to the cap, some observers in the State Department 
of Education called the program “flat-grant add-on” rather than an equalization 
program (Tracy, 30).   
Summary of 1975 Legislative Debate and Final Vote on the Guaranteed Tax 
Base 
The debates regarding the first school finance reform legislation took 
place during the 1975 spring session of the Connecticut General Assembly.  
Among the participants in the debates were Joseph Lieberman, Christopher 
Shays and Lawrence DeNardis, all of whom went on to careers in national 
politics.  After a rancorous debate in the House, the Senate debate began with 
Senator Joseph Lieberman asking the Clerk to announce the bill so that members 
would return to their seats in light of “such a significant issue.”  Next, Senator 
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Houley moved to adopt the Committee’s joint favorable report on House Bill 
6310 heralding it as “a very historic first in the State of Connecticut as the bill 
before us ends the era of the flat grant system of state assistance to local 
educational costs and a small step forward that moves us toward the long-range 
goal of equal educational opportunities.”  She noted the many individuals who 
have worked very long to place “before our consideration today the concept of a 
guaranteed tax base and of equalization of the opportunity and the opportunity 
for equal education” (Houley 1975, 2375).   
      The near unanimity of the passage of the bill does not tell the whole story.  
One of the more controversial legislative proposals that generated heated 
discussions was the so called “robinhood” approach.    The legislative proposal 
which originated in the House, took money from some towns and gave to others 
what is referred to formally as the recapture provision.  Embedded in the school 
finance reform debates are fundamental questions about equity, is the reform fair, 
and if so fair to whom, redistribution necessarily implies winners and losers.    
Most legislators found the idea unpalatable.  One Senator stated that “we had 
basic confidence in the basic fairness of our colleagues, and that in the end they 
would not pit community against community and legislator against legislator, in 
stealing from one town to give to another” (Gunther 1975, 2379). The 
Appropriations and Education Committee revised the formula to omit the 
provision after an outcry from legislators. 
      Finally, Bill 6310 was passed in the Senate by a vote of 34 in favor, 1 
against and 1 abstention.  While the ink was drying on the new legislation, the 
state appealed the Superior Court’s decision to the State Supreme Court.  The 
1977 Supreme Court decision prompted the legislature to return to the drawing 
board and empanel a second commission for the purpose of complying with the 
court’s directive devise an equalization plan. 
      The statesmanlike debate in the Senate came only came after a rancorous 
debate in the House. Among those who questioned the proposed formula to 
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calculate aid, Representative Christopher Shays, vigorously questioned 
committee members about the basis to derive a town’s property wealth.  Shays 
district encompassing among the wealthiest towns in Connecticut such as 
Greenwich stood to loose out under this new plan.  Despite the reservations of 
some House members, the bill passed and went on to the Senate. 
      In introducing the Senate debate, co-chairs of the Commission, Senator 
DeNardis, was asked to explain the specific details of the legislation.  He 
recounted how the commission considered Connecticut’ system in light of cases 
that were successfully brought in other states and we knew back in 1973 that it 
would only be “a matter of time before Connecticut’s system would be subject to 
a similar attack”.  He went on to state that “Noting the wide variance in property 
values and taxation, the flat grant does little to equalize that.  The quality of a 
child’s education should not depend on the wealth of his parents or neighbors 
within the school district” (Lawrence DeNardis 1975, 2388). 
      However, a few Senators went on the record noting that while they voted 
in favor out of deference and in recognition of the hard work of the Commission, 
they had serious reservations about the legislation ranging from the equity of the 
formula to the method of financing it through a state lottery.  In fact, when the 
bill was first introduced in the House in February it appeared to be doomed, due 
to looming fiscal problems.  After the legislation went through several iterations 
and public input sessions, school finance reform was widely discussed around 
Connecticut in public forums and news stories. 
      While the Commission’s work was well underway, Judge Jay Rubinow 
issued his “Memorandum of Decision” in December 1974 declaring the use of the 
local property tax to fund education as violating Sections I and 20 of Article First 
of the Connecticut constitution of every child to receive an equal education with 
all other children in the state.  Meanwhile, the Commission continued to study 
school finance in order to prepare legislative proposals that would fend off 
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further litigation.  The Meskill administration immediately appealed the Superior 
Court’s decision. 
The GTB and Municipal Overburden 
      Not surprisingly, there were several compromises that were struck to 
secure passage of the 1975 GTB legislation.  State Senator DeNardis expressed 
mixed emotions about the resulting legislation:  
It is extremely important to begin but unfortunate not to 
have dealt with the closely-related problem of overall tax reform – 
“twins of the same problem”.  Some say the formula goes beyond 
what the school finance problem involves – by using an income 
factor and the population of the entire town as opposed to per 
pupil assessed valuation and attempts to do more than equalize 
school finance capacity (Larence DeNardis 1975, 2399). 
 
The legislators vowed to work out inequities the next year.  The General 
Assembly doubled the GTB appropriation in 1976 providing additional per pupil 
grants ranging from $20-100 dollars still well below what would be needed to 
equalize spending disparities. 
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Implementation of School Finance Reform in Connecticut 
      Connecticut represents an interesting anomaly in the area of school 
finance reform.  On one hand, it was an early adopter of reforms.  In fact, the 
legislature took pre-emptive action fashioning an equalization plan years before 
the court rendered a decision in Horton (1977).  Yet, after thirty years of 
equalization formulas, it has lagged behind other states in terms of the amount of 
state funding provided to public schools.   
      School finance policy making in Connecticut is marked by both 
similarities and differences from other states. It has encountered many of the 
same stumbling blocks experienced elsewhere namely fiscal constraints and 
recalcitrant legislatures. Beyond the usual problems, tackling school finance 
reform in Connecticut has also been compounded by a set of factors that made 
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reform even more difficult.  Systemic features such as the tax system in 
Connecticut marked by the lack of a personal income tax for much of the time 
period under study greatly constrained the parameters for policy choice.      
     Educational policy implementation in Connecticut with respect to school 
finance reform has been particularly impacted by exogenous factors such as the 
economy.  It can best be characterized as incremental, contingent, and variable 
depending in large part of the vicissitudes of economic cycles and in turn the 
state’s budgetary situation and overall tax structure.  Policies were adopted in 
largely an incremental fashion punctuated by brief periods of policy intensity 
while legislatures attempted to keep pace with court decisions.  After adoption of 
policy reforms, implementation efforts were eroded due to cyclical recessions 
and other economic downturns that prompted fiscal retrenchment at the state 
level.12  One of the first victims to fall prey to budgetary cuts was school aid. 
      A typical pattern in Connecticut’s school finance experience was the 
following: policy reforms were adopted which were quickly reversed or 
mitigated due to fiscal retrenchment owing in large part to economic recessions 
that hit the Northeast during the late 1970s, early 1980s and early 1990s.  Each of 
these time periods dovetailed with critical junctures in school finance history 
when key legislation was passed.  In addition, to exogenous economic factors, 
endogenous factors such as the structure of the tax system in Connecticut created 
little leeway for new initiatives particularly those that were redistributive in 
nature.  A precarious tax structure that allowed little room for new expenditures 
was made more precarious when economic downturns hit did in each decade 
since the passage of the first GTB legislation in 1975.  Such economic uncertainty 
exacerbated the already deep ambivalence that many legislators had towards 
school finance.  All of these factors were the environment in which school finance 
was implemented in Connecticut and undermined serious reforms efforts. 
                                               
12  For a full discussion of the impact the economic recession of the 1970s on school 
finance equity see Berne (1988), 159-180. 
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Structure of Connecticut’s Tax System 
The structure of Connecticut’s state finance system served in many 
instances to constrain the parameters for action in the area of school finance.  
Among the factors that hindered any new spending initiatives were the already 
high sales tax, the lack of a personal income tax and one of the highest property 
tax rates in the country (National Institute of Education 1981, 20).  Although 
Connecticut was the wealthiest state in per capita income, most of this personal 
wealth would not be available to the public coffers owing to the fact that until 
1991 the Constitution state was one of only a few states not to levy a broad based 
income tax.   The reliance on a general sales tax as well as gasoline and cigarette 
taxes left Connecticut vulnerable to economic downturns.  Educational reformers 
had the herculean task of revising a new school finance system within the state’s 
existing tax structure. 
Reworking the GTB Formula:  “Same Time Next Year” 
A recurring theme in the ongoing school finance reform is the cyclical 
nature of the policy making process.  Beginning with the first GTB legislation, 
dissatisfaction with the final legislation led some to promise that the formula 
would be reworked during the next legislative session. 
       In his concluding remarks State Senator DeNardis stated his hope that  
Depending on how the judges view this piece of legislation, 
we may satisfy the plaintiffs in that case in whole or part, but at 
least we are being responsible as a legislative body and not waiting 
for the courts to dictate to us, to tell us what to do (Lawrence 
DeNardis 1975, 2403). 
 
Implicit in his remarks are the recognition that a first attempt to produce an 
equalization plan, albeit imperfect, was preferable to the alternative, a court 
ordered plan.  So began a thirty year quest to equalize school finances in 
Connecticut.  The original GTB legislation was undertaken with the agreement 
that the plan would be phased in over a five-year period.  This approach left the 
reform vulnerable to subsequent legislative action. In fact, the legislation 
New England Journal of Political Science 
268 
 
underwent no fewer than five amendments during the 1980’s which prompted 
Wesley Horton to return to court. 
Policy Options Post Horton I: “Opening Up Creativity” 
In addressing a group of Connecticut legislators, John Coons (Professor at 
the University of California School of Law) expressed his belief that the Horton 
(1977) decision would open up creativity in the legislative process” (Coons 1978). 
We won those cases on the principle that the legislature 
would not be in any way impeded in using any decentralized 
system, including the family, as the school district, so long as it did 
not make the amount of public money for a child's education a 
function of the wealth of the child's family or the school district. To 
do that would be an irrational and unfair standard for a public 
agency, in our view. We published a book in 1970 called Private 
Wealth and Public Education, which expressed this constitutional 
theory. We analyzed 14 or 15 state school systems and described 
how they could be reoriented without either wrecking or 
decreasing local control (Coons 2002). 
 
      The second commission fortunately did not have to reinvent the wheel as 
it attempted to comply with the court’s order.  The first GTB legislation passed in 
May 1975 laid the groundwork for subsequent reform efforts and served as a 
basic template to guide future reformers. As the legislature began its 
deliberations in the wake of the Horton decision, the basic question which they 
posed to one another was: what was the court looking for that would satisfy the 
concerns raised by Horton v. Meskill? Perhaps factoring into their decision not to 
prescribe a remedy, the Horton decision recognized and referenced the work of 
the legislature and the GTB in the written decision.  Ultimately, while the court 
commended the legislature for its efforts, it deemed the GTB reform as 
“miniscule”.  Perhaps it should be noted that the GTB as a method itself was not 
to blame but rather the insufficient funds appropriated by the legislature that led 
the court make its declaration. 
      While the work of the first commission was an attempt to satisfy some yet 
to be articulated legal standard and by so doing possibly fend off litigation 
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through preemptive action, the post-Horton (I) reform efforts were done with the 
knowledge that they were working under the full gaze of the court and the 
public expectation that something substantial needed to be done to reform 
Connecticut’s school finance system.  Compliance became the watchword of the 
second commission.  Discerning what will pass muster with the courts is always 
a difficult task made even more difficult by the fact it did not issue any 
guidelines to the legislature beyond having to produce a constitutionally 
acceptable school finance plan by May 1, 1979.  There were, however, certain 
policy parameters that the legislature knew it could not exceed in devising a plan.  
Stated strenuously by Governor Ella Grasso, and echoing the oft repeated refrain 
by a long line of Connecticut governors before her, she reiterated emphatically 
that funding for any plan would not come through the adoption of a new 
personal income tax.  (Tracy, 1984, 75) 
      After the Connecticut State Supreme Court handed down its decision to 
the legislature, key members of the House and Senate convened a second panel 
for the purpose of studying and making recommendations regarding the options 
for financing Connecticut’s schools.   The second such panel convened for this 
purpose, it differed in a number of respects from the previous commission.  
While the composition of the panel included many of the previous members 
from the first commission, the second panel included a group that had been 
largely silent partners, the Connecticut State Board of Education and the 
Department of Education.  While Education Department Commissioner Mark 
Shedd was a member of the first panel and lauded the work of the panel 
deeming its recommendations as being “sound” adopted a more vigorous 
viewpoint on the second panel.  On the heels of the Horton decision, the state 
auditor’s office roundly criticized the Department of Education as lacking 
leadership and failing to uphold the educational interests of the state (Tracy, 31).   
Thus, the Department viewed the school finance reform issue as a vehicle to 
shore up its public image and became a key player on the second commission 
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and in crafting the remedy in the wake of the Horton decision.   Additionally, the 
commission was underwritten by a grant from HEW which would help generate 
data and proposals and gave the Education Department significant influence 
over the flow of finance reform options.   
      The Department of Education played a more prominent role in the 
crafting of recommendations for the Second Commission.  Prior to the mid-1970s, 
state boards of education had been politically weak and marginal policy actors in 
most states including Connecticut (Furman).  With the property tax revolts in the 
early 1970s and the perceived failures of public education in general, education 
became a more highly salient political issue.  The reform coalition that had begun 
to take shape would place state education agencies in a more prominent position.   
      In Connecticut, Education Commissioner Shedd and the Department had 
several goals for school finance reform.  First among its priorities was to increase 
the state share of the total cost of public education to 40% up from 27% in the 
mid 1970s with 100 million dollars allocated for 1975-1976 (Tracy, 4).  To 
accomplish such a funding goal, the Department believed a personal income 
would have to be the source of revenue.  The Department was also influential in 
developing many of the details of the equalization formula including a minimum 
expenditure require for local school districts and an income factor that would 
accord more weight to school districts with disadvantaged students. 
Post Horton I:  Implementation of 1979 GTB Legislation 
      The revised GTB legislation was enacted on July 1, 1979.  The law (P.A. 79-
128) called for a five year phase-in with 56% of the full costs of funding in FY 80, 
67% in FY 81, 78% in FY 82, 89% in FY 83 and 100% of costs on full funding in FY 
84 and thereafter.  Douglas Reed points out that if fully funded “The formula 
was in many ways, a state of the art financing plan that would have substantially 
equalized the tax bases of Connecticut’s cities and towns.”  In actuality, the 
funding was less than 10% of the amount it would require to fully fund the 
formula.  Also during this time period rising school public expenditures also 
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shrank the real dollar value of the funds to the point that they were actually 
lower than 1975 levels.   
    Put differently, education historian Christopher Collier described the new 
GTB plan as less effective and more cumbersome than the first GTB plan owing 
to the sheer complexity of the formula.  Factors used to distribute school under 
the new modified GTB plan included a town’s wealth, tax effort and need 
(Connecticut State Board of Education 1979).  The calculation of the grant begins 
with a ranking of all towns based on the ability to pay for school services from 
local tax sources. Major differences between the first formula and the 1979 
legislation were the inclusion of income wealth and the weighting of children 
who received Aid to Families with Dependent Children or welfare.   
      Another major difference between the earlier GTB plan and the 1979 
legislation was the Minimum Expenditure Requirement or MER.  The legislation 
set a minimum dollar figure that every district had to meet or exceed which 
would obligate towns to commit a certain amount of new education aid to 
schools designed to prevent towns from utilizing the funds for property tax relief.  
As Collier (2008, 607) points out:  
This Minimal Expenditure Requirement (MER) was to 
provide no fewer dollars than the statewide median per-student 
expenditure two years previous to the year in which it was granted. 
In fact, however, by 1984 neither the GTB plan of 1975 nor the 
schedule of 1979 had been fully funded, nor were they ever. 
 
      Compounding the problem was the financial disaster that hit Connecticut 
during the late 1970s and 1980s with inflation rising as high as 13% which 
dramatically impacted state revenues.  It was in this climate that the legislature 
passed 10 amendments to the 1979 GTB legislation to retrench the budget by 
establishing caps on the amount each district could receive. (Reed 2001, 80).  
      In a policy analysis paper, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston noted that 
“these restrictions which were legislatively imposed on the formula during the 
phase-in period created a system that was difficult to understand and hard to 
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administer” (Anonymous 1999).  Wesley Horton viewed the amendments as 
undermining the gains he had worked so to hard to obtain on behalf of schools.  
He entered a show-cause motion in Superior Court in 1978 to enjoin the state 
from distributing state education aid under the existing GTB program and then 
entered courtroom again in 1985 under Horton III (1985). 
Horton III (1985) 
Horton III (1985) challenged the GTB and the distribution formula adopted 
by the General Assembly.  In issuing it’s ruling, the Connecticut State Supreme 
Court devised a three-step test to determine if the formula met the state’s 
constitutional obligation..  In a novel approach to school finance reform, the 
courts applied the legal reasoning used in the recent reapportionment case used 
for legislative districting.  The Court imposed a more demanding burden of 
proof that plaintiffs would have to meet in bringing adequacy claims against the 
state (Reed 1996). During the mid to late 1980s, the legislature passed the 
Educational Enhancement Act whose main thrust was to make grants to towns 
for teacher salaries (Collier, 609)  These decisions convinced Wesley Horton that 
there were significant strides being made to equalize resources such that he 
refrained from filing additional lawsuits against the state. 
The Foundation Model and Education Cost Sharing 
      In response to Horton III there was a brief upward trend in funding. The 
General Assembly passed a foundation model in 1988 which set a foundation 
figure for each town and then contributes a sum on a sliding scale reflecting the 
town’s tax base.13  The Education Cost Sharing formula components consist of 
foundation, resident students, poverty weighting, mastery weighting, town 
wealth, SGWL (State Guaranteed Wealth Level), capping/phase-in, and hold 
harmless/minimum aid.  The last time the ECS formula was changed was 1995. 
                                               
13  An example cited in Collier (2008) illustrates the point: if the foundation figure 
was $5,981 in 2007, Greenwich might get $2,000 from the state and have to raise $3,891, 
itself. 
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      The key difference between ECS and GTB is blended wealth.  The GTB 
considered property wealth per capita and used a per capita income measure 
include to adjust each town’s Equalized Net Grand List or ENGL.  ECS in 1995-
1996 expanded the definition of town wealth to factor in property wealth on both 
a per student and per capita basis and adjust for income using both per capital 
income and median household income.  The averaging of these four measures 
gives towns with different demographics the potential benefit that might be 
missed if only a single measure were used. 
      After hitting a high water mark in 1990 with 44.7% of school funds 
providing by the state, Connecticut experienced another recession in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  Due to economic expediency, towns were allowed to 
forego the minimum expenditure requirement..  Since the inception of the ECS 
grant in 1989 until today, the grant program would be routinely underfunded by 
the Connecticut General Assembly through capping provisions.  As the 
Connecticut Conference of Municipalities noted in a recent report, the net effect 
of such caps would mean that “one in four municipalities still receive less per 
pupil in ECS aid then under the $250 per pupil flat-grant funding system that 
was determined to be unconstitutional in 1977.”14 
Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding v. Rell 
The chronic underfunding of school aid formulas through ECS capping 
provisions prompted a public advocacy group to file a lawsuit against the 
administration of Governor Rell. Wesley Horton had long since left the 
unfinished business from Horton v. Meskill to become part of the legal litigating 
Sheff v. O’Neill lawsuits dealing with the racial segregation of Hartford’s schools.  
No longer the standard bearer of the movement, other public advocacy groups 
had stepped into the breach to carry the movement forward.  One such group, 
under the auspices of Yale University Law School was the Connecticut Coalition 
                                               
14  For a full discussion of the ECS cap, see Connecticut Conference of 
Municipalities (2009). 
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for Justice in Education Funding [CCJEF]. This organization filed a lawsuit 
against the Rell administration in the spring of 2005.  The lawsuit alleges that 
“the state’s failure to suitably and equitably fund its public schools has 
irreparably harmed thousands of Connecticut schoolchildren” (295 Conn. 240 
(2008), overview at http://ccjef,org/overview .htm).  In partial response to the 
litigation, Governor Rell empanelled a Commission on Education Finance, the 7th 
commission since the inception of the first equalization plan. 
The Seventh and Final Commission on School Finance? 
The Seventh Commission to Study School Finance in Connecticut was 
empanelled by Governor Rell in January of 2006 and issued its final 
recommendations in January of 2007. The gubernatorial commission was divided 
into three subcommittees:  ECS, accountability, and other education grants.  Not 
surprisingly, the ECS subcommittee concluded that the state is spending 
significant less than what the originally proposed formula would have funded 
education (Connecticut Commission on Education Finance 2006). 
Based on the subcommittee’s recommendation and with a budget surplus 
working in her favor, Governor Rell proposed an unprecedented increased in 
funds for ECS.  Ultimately, the Democratically-controlled General Assembly 
chose to fund other spending priorities. 15   Meanwhile, CCJEF v. Rell is still 
working its way through the Connecticut Supreme Court.  The outcome of the 
lawsuit will determine whether Horton will continue his odyssey. 
Conclusions 
School finance reform has been marked by many of the same pitfalls that 
other states have encountered in the design and implementation of school aid 
formulas.  However, as argued in this paper, Connecticut’s difficulties have been 
more pronounced due to a confluence of political and financial factors that have 
exacerbated a difficult situation. 
                                               
15  The Connecticut Conference of Municipalities noted that the legislature allocated 
around $200 million of the 1 billion budget proposal submitted by Governor Rell. 
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      The lion’s share of the policy failure rests with the Connecticut General 
Assembly.  As the body prompted by court decisions to design an equalization 
plan, much of the responsibility can be squarely placed at the legislature’s 
doorstep.  While the design of the equalization plans differed depending on 
whether Democrats or Republicans controlled the General Assembly, what did 
not differ greatly was the tendency through the time period under review was a 
notable reluctance e to fully fund equalization schemes. Both political parties 
seemed to be equally concerned with cost containment yielding to important 
political realities.  Gubernatorial inaction, legislative recalcitrance and looming 
financial and fiscal realities all conspired to doom school finance reform in 
Connecticut. 
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